Docker Sandbox - IronClaw

IronClaw provides a Docker-based sandbox for executing long-running jobs in isolated containers. Each job runs in its own environment with strict resource limits, credential injection, and real-time event streaming.

Architecture

┌───────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│              Orchestrator                       │
│                                                 │
│  Internal API (default :50051, configurable)    │
│    POST /worker/{id}/llm/complete               │
│    POST /worker/{id}/llm/complete_with_tools    │
│    GET  /worker/{id}/job                        │
│    GET  /worker/{id}/credentials                │
│    POST /worker/{id}/status                     │
│    POST /worker/{id}/complete                   │
│                                                 │
│  ContainerJobManager                            │
│    create_job() -> container + token             │
│    stop_job()                                    │
│    list_jobs()                                   │
│                                                 │
│  TokenStore                                     │
│    per-job bearer tokens (in-memory only)       │
│    per-job credential grants (in-memory only)   │
└───────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Job Modes

Worker

Standard IronClaw agent with proxied LLM calls through the orchestrator

Claude Code

Spawns the official claude CLI directly for Claude Code workflows

Creating Jobs

Via Tool

{
  "tool": "job_create",
  "title": "Refactor authentication module",
  "description": "Extract auth logic into a separate crate, add tests",
  "mode": "worker",
  "project_dir": "~/.ironclaw/projects/myapp",
  "credential_grants": [
    {
      "env_var": "GITHUB_TOKEN",
      "source": "github_pat"
    }
  ]
}

Via CLI

# Create a worker job
ironclaw job create \
  --title "Deploy to staging" \
  --description "Pull latest, run tests, deploy" \
  --mode worker \
  --project ~/.ironclaw/projects/myapp

# Create a Claude Code job
ironclaw job create \
  --mode claude-code \
  --title "Add OAuth flow" \
  --description "Implement OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow"

# List jobs
ironclaw job list

# Stop a job
ironclaw job stop <job-id>

# View logs
ironclaw job logs <job-id>

Worker Mode

Runs the IronClaw agent inside a container with LLM calls proxied through the orchestrator:

Container Configuration

ContainerJobConfig {
    image: "ironclaw-worker:latest",
    memory_limit_mb: 2048,
    cpu_shares: 1024,
    orchestrator_port: 50051,
}

Security Constraints

No network access (except orchestrator API)
Read-only filesystem (except /tmp and project dir)
CPU throttling via cgroup shares
Memory limits enforced by Docker
No privileged operations
Credentials injected via env vars, never in image

Execution Flow

Orchestrator creates container
- Generates unique bearer token
- Stores credential grants
- Starts container with orchestrator URL

Worker fetches job description

GET /worker/{id}/job
Authorization: Bearer <token>

Worker fetches credentials

GET /worker/{id}/credentials
Authorization: Bearer <token>

Worker runs agent loop
- LLM calls proxied through orchestrator
- Tool execution within container
- Real-time events streamed

Worker reports completion

POST /worker/{id}/complete
{
  "success": true,
  "message": "Refactoring complete",
  "iterations": 8
}

LLM Proxy

The worker uses ProxyLlmProvider to forward requests:

impl LlmProvider for ProxyLlmProvider {
    async fn complete(
        &self,
        messages: &[ChatMessage],
    ) -> Result<String, LlmError> {
        let resp = self.client
            .post("/llm/complete")
            .bearer_auth(&self.token)
            .json(&CompletionRequest { messages })
            .send()
            .await?;
        
        Ok(resp.text().await?)
    }

    async fn complete_with_tools(
        &self,
        messages: &[ChatMessage],
        tools: &[ToolDefinition],
    ) -> Result<RespondResult, LlmError> {
        // Similar proxy call
    }
}

Project Directory Binding

Optionally bind a host directory into the container:

# Project directory validation
# Must be under ~/.ironclaw/projects/
~/.ironclaw/projects/myapp -> /workspace (inside container)

Validation prevents path traversal:

fn validate_bind_mount_path(
    dir: &Path,
    job_id: Uuid,
) -> Result<PathBuf, OrchestratorError> {
    let canonical = dir.canonicalize()?;
    let base = ironclaw_base_dir().join("projects").canonicalize()?;
    
    if !canonical.starts_with(&base) {
        return Err(OrchestratorError::ContainerCreationFailed {
            job_id,
            reason: format!(
                "Project dir {} is outside allowed base {}",
                canonical.display(),
                base.display()
            ),
        });
    }
    
    Ok(canonical)
}

Claude Code Mode

Spawns the official Anthropic claude CLI for Claude Code workflows:

Configuration

# API key (takes priority)
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...

# Or OAuth token from local session
export CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=$(cat ~/.claude/oauth_token)

# Model selection
export CLAUDE_CODE_MODEL=sonnet  # sonnet, opus, haiku

# Resource limits
export CLAUDE_CODE_MEMORY_LIMIT_MB=4096
export CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_TURNS=50

# Tool allowlist
export CLAUDE_CODE_ALLOWED_TOOLS="bash,cat,file_operations,memory"

Container Setup

FROM ubuntu:22.04

# Install Claude CLI
RUN curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/cli/install.sh | bash

# Install dependencies
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
    git curl wget jq python3 python3-pip \
    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/claude"]

Execution

# Inside container
claude \
  --model sonnet \
  --max-turns 50 \
  --allowed-tools bash,file_operations \
  "$(cat /tmp/task_description.txt)"

Features

Full Claude Code experience inside sandbox
Tool filtering via allowlist
OAuth or API key auth
Real-time streaming to UI
Project directory binding for code access

Credential Injection

Credentials are injected at runtime, never baked into images:

Grant Definition

pub struct CredentialGrant {
    /// Environment variable name (e.g. "GITHUB_TOKEN")
    pub env_var: String,
    /// Source credential ID from secrets store
    pub source: String,
}

Injection Flow

Job creation: Grants stored in TokenStore
Worker startup: Fetches credentials via /credentials endpoint
Tool execution: Credentials injected into child processes via Command::envs()

// Never use std::env::set_var (unsafe in multi-threaded runtime)
// Instead, inject per-command:
let mut cmd = Command::new("git");
cmd.arg("push");
cmd.envs(self.extra_env.as_ref());  // Inject credentials
let output = cmd.output().await?;

Security Properties

Never logged (redacted from debug output)
Never persisted (in-memory only)
Scoped to job (revoked on completion)
Process-isolated (not in global env)

Real-Time Events

Jobs stream events to the orchestrator for UI visibility:

Event Types

type JobEvent =
  | { type: 'message'; role: 'assistant'; content: string }
  | { type: 'tool_use'; tool: string; input: object }
  | { type: 'tool_result'; tool: string; output: string; success: boolean }
  | { type: 'result'; success: boolean; message: string }
  | { type: 'status'; state: string; iteration: number }

Streaming API

GET /api/jobs/{id}/events
Authorization: Bearer <auth-token>

# SSE stream
event: message
data: {"role":"assistant","content":"Starting deployment..."}

event: tool_use
data: {"tool":"shell","input":{"command":"git pull"}}

event: tool_result
data: {"tool":"shell","output":"Already up to date","success":true}

event: result
data: {"success":true,"message":"Deployment complete"}

Resource Limits

Memory

// Worker mode
memory_limit_mb: 2048

// Claude Code mode (heavier)
memory_limit_mb: 4096

Enforced via Docker --memory flag.

CPU

cpu_shares: 1024  // Default Docker weight

Throttles CPU usage but doesn’t hard-cap.

Timeout

timeout: Duration::from_secs(600)  // 10 minutes default

Jobs are killed if they exceed timeout.

Concurrent Jobs

export JOB_MAX_CONCURRENT=5

Global limit across all users.

Container Lifecycle

Creation

let job_id = Uuid::new_v4();
let token = job_manager.create_job(
    job_id,
    "Deploy to staging",
    Some(PathBuf::from("~/.ironclaw/projects/myapp")),
    JobMode::Worker,
    vec![CredentialGrant {
        env_var: "GITHUB_TOKEN".to_string(),
        source: "github_pat".to_string(),
    }],
).await?;

Monitoring

let handle = job_manager.get_job(job_id).await?;
print_status(&handle);

Cleanup

// Graceful stop
job_manager.stop_job(job_id).await?;

// Force kill after grace period
job_manager.kill_job(job_id).await?;

Containers are automatically removed after 1 hour of inactivity.

Docker API

Uses bollard for Docker interaction:

use bollard::Docker;
use bollard::container::{CreateContainerOptions, Config};

let docker = Docker::connect_with_socket_defaults()?;

let container = docker.create_container(
    Some(CreateContainerOptions {
        name: format!("ironclaw-job-{}", job_id),
        ..Default::default()
    }),
    Config {
        image: Some("ironclaw-worker:latest"),
        env: Some(vec![
            format!("IRONCLAW_JOB_ID={}", job_id),
            format!("IRONCLAW_WORKER_TOKEN={}", token),
            format!("ORCHESTRATOR_URL=http://host.docker.internal:50051"),
        ]),
        host_config: Some(HostConfig {
            memory: Some(2048 * 1024 * 1024),
            cpu_shares: Some(1024),
            binds: Some(vec![
                format!("{}:/workspace", project_dir.display()),
            ]),
            ..Default::default()
        }),
        ..Default::default()
    },
).await?;

docker.start_container(&container.id, None).await?;

Building Images

Worker Image

FROM rust:1.75-slim

WORKDIR /app

# Copy IronClaw binary
COPY target/release/ironclaw /usr/local/bin/

# Container-safe tools only
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
    git curl wget jq \
    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

ENTRYPOINT ["ironclaw", "worker"]

Building

# Build worker image
docker build -f Dockerfile.worker -t ironclaw-worker:latest .

# Test locally
docker run --rm \
  -e IRONCLAW_JOB_ID=test \
  -e IRONCLAW_WORKER_TOKEN=test \
  -e ORCHESTRATOR_URL=http://host.docker.internal:50051 \
  ironclaw-worker:latest

Security Considerations

Network Isolation

Containers have no internet access except the orchestrator API. Use credential injection for external API calls through the host.

Filesystem Sandboxing

Root filesystem is read-only. Only /tmp and the project directory (if bound) are writable.

Privilege Dropping

Containers run as non-root user. No --privileged flag, no capabilities.

Token Security

Per-job bearer tokens are generated randomly and stored in-memory only. Tokens are revoked on job completion.

Credential Leakage

Credentials are redacted from logs and never persisted to disk. Leak detector scans all outputs.

Documentation Index

​Architecture

​Job Modes

Worker

Claude Code

​Creating Jobs

​Via Tool

​Via CLI

​Worker Mode

​Container Configuration

​Security Constraints

​Execution Flow

​LLM Proxy

​Project Directory Binding

​Claude Code Mode

​Configuration

​Container Setup

​Execution

​Features

​Credential Injection

​Grant Definition

​Injection Flow

​Security Properties

​Real-Time Events

​Event Types

​Streaming API

​Resource Limits

​Memory

​CPU

​Timeout

​Concurrent Jobs

​Container Lifecycle

​Creation

​Monitoring

​Cleanup

​Docker API

​Building Images

​Worker Image

​Building

​Security Considerations

​Next Steps

Channels

Configuration

Architecture

Job Modes

Creating Jobs

Via Tool

Via CLI

Worker Mode

Container Configuration

Security Constraints

Execution Flow

LLM Proxy

Project Directory Binding

Claude Code Mode

Configuration

Container Setup

Execution

Features

Credential Injection

Grant Definition

Injection Flow

Security Properties

Real-Time Events

Event Types

Streaming API

Resource Limits

Memory

CPU

Timeout

Concurrent Jobs

Container Lifecycle

Creation

Monitoring

Cleanup

Docker API

Building Images

Worker Image

Building

Security Considerations

Next Steps